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Foreword 
This Working Paper is a summary of the Workshop on "Macroeconomic Stabilization of Eco- 
nomies in 7kansitionn which was held at the Hotel President, Prague, Czech Republic on 22-24 
April 1993. The workshop was organized by the Economic Transition and Integration Project of 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Institute for Economic 
Policy affiliated to the Ministry of Economy of the Czech Republic. 
The purpose of the workshop was to assemble responsible policy makers, interested scholars 
from Central and Eastern European countries, as well as western experts t o  thoroughly dis- 
cuss the accumulated experience with macroeconomic stabilization during economic reforms in 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech and Slovak Republics (the former ~ S F R  as well), Hun- 
gary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and the Ukraine. Those who presented papers and those who 
commented on them aimed at drawing attention to problems that are now explicit and press- 
ing in countries which started with reforms sooner and are very likely to  emerge in countries 
that started later. The organizers of the workshop firmly believed that the dissemination of 
experience from the more advanced reform countries could contribute to a better understanding 
of burdensome stabilization tasks and to  a future improvement and refinement of stabilization 
policies and tools. Undoubtedly, a smoother and more successful transition will benefit not only 
the less advanced countries but to  the region as a whole. 
In retrospect we may now conclude that a good basis for a fruitful exchange of views and 
stimulating discussions was provided at the workshop. Many thanks go to  all the policy experts 
and scholars who contributed to this meeting. The program and the final list of participants 
can be found in the Appendices. 
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1 Introduction 
Macroeconomic stabilization of formerly centrally planned economies is generally perceived to 
be an essential requirement in the transition process to  a market-type economy. Fairly bulky 
demand- or monetary overhang accumulated in the past and inherited from the former socialist 
economy represented a major threat for the price stability at the very beginning of reforms. 
Widespread fears that latent inflationary pressures will generate (after liberalization of prices) 
a hyperinflationary spiral and endanger the attainment of other goals called for monetary, fiscal 
and wage restrictions or a t  least soundness. It was also suggested that some decline of output 
and employment is necessary, inescapable or even desirable during transition. Nevertheless, 
a related rise of unemployment had to stay within affordable limits which would ensure the 
conservation of the social peace as a necessary condition for pushing through the painful reform 
measures. Thus, limited government interventions in favor of ironing out the wildest fluctuations 
were envisaged. 
Generally, the stabilization of crucial macroeconomic variables should set the stage for a 
smooth and rapid transformation of the institutional background, property rights, and behav- 
ioral patterns of economic agents. Consequently, the target of stabilization has been assigned 
a significant role in all reform blue-prints. While the initial results of stabilization programs 
prove to be reasonably promising in some countries or regions, there are also signs of partial, 
or even complete failures. In any case the stabilization phase seems to  be, after several years of 
experience, a relatively easier task to  accomplish than other parts of the reform packages. 
The workshop had four main topics: 
1. Price liberalization in a post-socialist economy: impact on macroeconomic stability; 
2. The role of monetary, fiscal and wage policies in stabilizing the economies; 
3. Exchange rate policy and external pressures: search for a stabilizing anchor; 
4. Microeconomic preconditions for macroeconomic (in)stability. 
The goal of this paper is to  summarize the ideas presented by workshop participants and to  
identify topical questions arising from the discussions. Its structure loosely adheres to the above 
session topics. The following section presents a more comprehensive assessment of economic 
development of the former CSFR. The simultaneous occurrence of both positive and negative 
developments illustrates an ambivalence contained in reforms in all countries. 
The third section deals briefly with price liberalization which was carried out quite extensively 
at  the beginning in all reform programs. Romanian experience in this field is analyzed and 
comparisons with some other countries are discussed. 
The main burden of stabilization policies rests on brcadly defined monetary and fiscal policies 
which are sometimes accompanied by wage policies. Polish and Czechoslovak cases are studied 
in the fourth section. 
Exchange rate policy and liberalization of imports and exports play a substantial role in 
many respects. On the one hand, pegging a domestic currency (to a stable foreign currency 
or to a basket of currencies) provides an important anchor in a world of uncertain and highly 
fluctuating macroeconomic variables; on the other hand, the initiation of export-led growth 
could foster the general economic recovery and the inflow of much needed capital goods could 
significantly speed up industrial restructuring. The fifth section is devoted to these issues. 
Macroeconomists tend to  explain macroeconomic phenomena by macroeconomic causes, us- 
ing macroeconomic tools. Many of these macroeconomic approaches could, however, be sim- 
ply inappropriate in highly non-standard conditions (which prevail in today's post-socialist 
economies). Certain microeconomic explanations are, indeed, relevant. The sixth section deals 
with inter-relations between macro- and microeconomic elements behind our macroeconomic 
reasoning. 
To systemize the thinking about stabilization policy in the following, we will focus on two 
aspects, i.e.: 
(a) the role of stabilization policy in the whole reform/transition architecture, and 
(b) the level of permissivity or restrictivity of stabilization policies during transition. 
The first aspect refers t o  the qualitative assessment of stabilization policies. It attempts to  
trace changes in the attention paid by policy makers in individual countries to the stabilization 
goal. It focuses on the relative position of stabilization effort in certain phases of transition with 
- 
respect to  other targets like privatization, liberalization of prices and trade, introduction of cer- 
tain levels of convertibility, or industrial restructuring of formerly centrally-planned economies. 
The issue of policy credibility is touched upon as well. The second aspect concentrates on quan- 
titative evaluation of stabilization policies. It wants to  identify what was the stance of monetary, 
fiscal and wage policies in different periods of transformation with respect to  their permissivity 
or restrictivity and what were the reasons behind policy adjustments. 
Taking this viewpoint into account, the final section summarizes the findings from the work- 
shop. preliminary conclusions are drawn up, lessons to be learned are pointed out, and 
an indication of some open issues. 
It is necessary to  note here, that this workshop was originally considered to  be the first in 
a series of three workshops which were to  be held in the former CSFR, Hungary, and Poland. 
The purpose of the workshops was t o  discuss, in a more detailed way, such areas of economic 
transition in which these three countries werelare relatively successful. As the former CSFR is 
generally regarded as a "leadern in macroeconomic stabilization, the option to  organize such a 
meeting in Prague was straightforward. With respect t o  this, much of the material presented 
during the sessions were drawn from experience accrued in the former ~ S F R  and in its successor 
states thus having a relatively large share in this working paper. 
The views contained in sections 2-6 reflect the ideas expressed by workshop participants. 
The opinions in section 7 are solely the responsibility of the author.' 
'I wish to express my sincere thanks to my colleague, J k o s  G k s ,  for his valuable comments to an earlier draft 
of this paper. Any possible misinterpretations, inconsistencies, or flaws in the paper are, indeed, my own. 
2 Positive Versus Negative Results of Ongoing Reforms: The 
Case of the CSFR 
The economic development of the former ~ S F R ,  after several years of reforms, is regarded by 
many experts as being quite suc~essful.~ Particularly macroeconomic indicators, in comparison 
with other countries in transition, display really impressive results. 
After some preparatory steps during 1990, reform actually started in January 1991. Its 
implementation followed two major lines: while the macroeconomic stabilization policies aimed 
a t  reaching both an internal and external equilibrium, the microeconomic package consisted of 
privatization, liberalization of prices, introduction of current account convertibility, liberalization 
of foreign trade transactions, privatization and setting up of a corresponding (market-type) 
institutional framework. Both official statements and real life events confirm that the attention 
of the reformers and decision makers concentrated mainly on macroeconomic adjustment in 
the initial period of the transformation. Macroeconomic stability was explicitly presented as a 
crucial and necessary condition enabling the implementation of other major reform steps. 
In January 1991 a sort of shock therapy was initiated. Almost 80% of prices (on the basis of 
GDP) were liberalized overnight, a large number of subsidies were radically reduced with many 
of them being completely abolished. Current account convertibility and massive devaluation of 
the Czechoslovak crown were other measures taken. 
The price jump connected with price liberalization rapidly faded out without being trans- 
formed into any inflationary spiral, as some had feared (monthly rate of inflation was 25.8% in 
January, 7% in February, and 4.7% in March). From the middle of 1991 through to  the end 
of 1992 the monthly inflation rate (CPI) was not higher than 2 percentage points. In spite 
of: (a) the increase of domestic price level; (b) a slowly widening scope of internal currency 
convertibility; and (c) the foreign exchange reserves volatility at the end of 1992 (generated by 
the forthcoming split of the country), the relation between the Czechoslovak currency and the 
basket of convertible currencies-the official exchange rate-remained virtually unchanged. The 
original level (28 CSK for 1 US dollar) stayed for 30 months (until June 1993). This was the 
result of the strategy which assigned the role of anchor to  the nominal exchange rate.3 Simulta- 
neous occurrence of domestic inflation and nominal exchange rate stability implied an implicit 
real revaluation of the crown. 
Two explanations4 could be found for this development: (1) in curbing inflationary pres- 
sures, combined fiscal, monetary and limited wage policies, which had been applied, were rather 
effective; and (2) though the aim of keeping the nominal exchange rate stable was explicit, it was 
not followed blindly, without respect to  huge uncertainties, discontinuities, and different kinds 
of changes. Instead, from the earliest stage of the transition, the Czechoslovak authorities, and 
especially the Central Bank, tried to  make only reasonable obligations and to  avert, as much as 
possible, any back-stepping. This solution aspired to  combine the advantages of setting a kind 
of stabilized "norm" with the advantages of flexible adjustment in case of need. There certainly 
remains room for discussions about the real impact of a devaluated exchange rate on the do- 
mestic price level. While the argument of an anchor does not lose its validity, its inflationary 
(and hence potentially destabilizing) influence could not be denied either. 
Part of the costs for curbing inflation is the negative economic growth. During 1991-1992 
the real GDP declined by 21.3%. This drop of economic activity was, however, reflected only 
'The following section is based on the paper and the presentation Macroeconomic Stabilization in Czechoda 
vakia: Costs and Benefits by Jan Klacek and the ensuing discussion. 
3Satisfying results of this strategy can be proved by the fact that in the middle of 1992 the foreign currency 
reserves of the former CSFR amounted to 5 L i o n  US dollars which was the highest level in the whole of post-war 
history. 
'A more general explanation of this favorable development could be traced back not only to pre-war history 
when monetary authorities used to implement fairly severe policies, but also to the post-war period when the 
central monebank (despite a strong non-monetary setting of the centrally planned economy) displayed undeniable 
signs of monetary soundness. 
very loosely by an increase in unemployment. While the rate of unemployment in the CSFR at  
the end of 1991 was 6.6%, i t  declined to 5.1% by the end of 1992. Wide regional disparity is 
hidden behind these aggregate figures-in Slovakia the rate of unemployment was nearly three 
times higher than that in the Czech Republic. The constantly declining (and strikingly low) 
rate of unemployment in the Czech Republic during the Spring months of 1993 even became a 
puzzle. 
As far as the transformation of property rights is concerned, according to  estimates a t  the 
beginning of 1993, more than 70% of retail trade turnover, 30% of construction activities (in 
terms of value added), and 15% of industrial output originated in the private sector. Never- 
theless, the future impact of voucher privatization is not clear and the behavior and impact of 
investment privatization funds is difficult to predict now. 
undeniable achievements should not conceal a less favorable phenomena. The dark side of 
reform changes seems to be the restructuring of the economy, which is far from being satisfactory. 
The share of low value added industries increased visibly and this trend was also reflected in the 
export profile. It is witnessing a decrease in the amount of machinery and transport equipment on 
the one hand, and an increase in the share of primary sector outputs on the other.5 A relatively 
high level of concentration of production still prevails: more than 30% of industrial output 
originates in enterprises with more than 5,000 employees. Not much occurred in agriculture in 
transforming the cooperative farms and a high level of uncertainty is present in this sector. 
Another negative phenomenon is the alarming scope of inter-enterprise arrears being esti- 
mated to  amount to 6 billion USD in the Czech Republic after the split of the former CSFR. 
The so-called "secondary indebtednessn reached about 85% of the total. The near future will 
answer the question of how much the existing and widespread inter-enterprise indebtedness will 
contribute to an expected wave of bankruptcies after the bankruptcy law came into full effect 
on 22 April 1993. It may turn out that, the domino effect which could accelerate within sev- 
eral months (after a three month "grace period") will generate a worsening of broad economic 
conditions with troublesome macroeconomic consequences. 
Additional complications arise from the split of the former CSFR. The Czech Republic will 
be exposed to  a t  least three risks: (1) a fall in trade with Slovakia, (2) insolvency of Slovak 
enterprises, and (3) import surcharges in Slovakia or devaluations of the Slovak crown. These 
and other factors (i.e., new tax system with complicated VAT collection, excessive activation of 
the bankruptcy law, trade-union pressures on employment, and wage policies) are potent enough 
to  undermine existing macroeconomic stability and hamper microeconomic transformation and 
restructuring. 
It could be stated, that the Czechoslovak case introduces an exception. Its experience does 
not seem to confirm a generally shared view, that the transition period is more difficult in 
countries which have not implemented any reforms during their socialist era (like Bulgaria and 
Romania) in comparison with those that did something (like Hungary and Poland). Moreover, 
it is also an example, that the relatively fast approach (which is sometimes incorrectly called 
shock-approach) does not necessarily bring worse results than more gradual reform programs. 
In comparison with other countries, several factors speak in favor of the Czechoslovak situation. 
Firstly, the starting conditions were more favorable (low foreign debt, small macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, low inflation, low degree of shortages). Secondly, some painful measures, like the 
bankruptcy law (or VAT reform) have only been taken recently. Thirdly, Czechoslovak policy 
makers learned some lessons from neighboring countries which started a little bit earlier, so that 
some mistakes could have been at  least partially alleviated. 
In assessing the impacts of reform measures taken, one must not forget about the CMEA 
collapse and a fundamental break-up of the old trade system among former socialist countries. 
Especially painful was the restructuring of trade with the former Soviet Union. It would have 
'While this conclusion is based on figures from domestic statistics, this trend need not be necessarily confirmed 
by using non-Czechoslovak statistical sources (e.g., OECD statistics). They indicate a slightly different picture 
not only with respect to the level of trade but also with respect to growth rates of trade volumes and its structure. 
been a mistake to assume and hope that it was possible to initiate deep economic changes and 
to preserve old economic relations. It is very difficult to imagine, for example, that former 
socialist countries could have still bought oil for 7 US dollars per barrel in 1991 and 1992. Even 
without all of the implemented stabilization measures, a certain decline of economic activity was 
inescapable. Only an extremely expansionary policy could have "saved" the enterprises whose 
existence was based on the old price structure of raw materials imported from the former Soviet 
Union. 
Several lines of criticism could be raised against the concrete way of carrying out the reform 
in former Czechoslovakia: 
1. It was an enormous mistake to publicly discuss the level of envisaged devaluation during 
1990. As a consequence, foreign currency reserves declined by 1.5 billion US dollars and, in 
addition, the generated expectation contributed to a sharper devaluation, which was not 
justified by the fundamentals and by the competitiveness of the economy. The resulting 
level of devaluation was thus higher than had been hoped for, half a year before. 
2. According to many views, monetary policy was too restrictive at  the beginning. The 
economy was squeezed at a time when it could have been more relaxed. A certain part of 
the responsibility for this development falls on the IMF which advised on the given dosage 
of the restriction. To tell the truth, the decisions were made in an exceedingly uncertain 
environment without having any idea about the possible outcomes. 
3. Privatization takes too long but it is necessary to admit that due to administrative and 
"parliamentary" bottlenecks the whole process could not have been substantially faster. 
4. The authorities failed in breaking up numerous monopolies which contributed to pushing 
up the general price level. 
Statistical problems complicate a more precise and reliable analysis of the real economy. 
One example is the household consumption figures. It is difficult to believe that the level of 
household consumption declined by 40% over a four month period in 1991 in a country which 
was neither in famine or war nor experiencing a high standard of living before. 
3 Price Liberalization in a Post-Socialist Economy: Romanian 
Gradualism 
Romania started its reforms in much worse initial conditions than other former Central or East 
European ec~nomies .~  Its economic structure was extremely distorted as a consequence of former 
industrial and investment policies which followed strictly equitable regional development. The 
allocation of production capacities and labor force ignored the criteria of comparative advantages 
given by a proximity of natural resources and networks of infrastructure in many areas. As a 
result, a peculiar picture of dispersed industries emerged, in which many of the municipalities 
were dependent upon a single industry with a one-sided specialization of the labor force in a 
region. This distorted system implied substantial output and employment losses when the move 
to a market-driven establishment was started. 
At the turn of 1989 and 1990 Romania announced a commitment to embark on fully-fledged 
economic reform. Many steps have been taken since: partial price liberalization; full liberaliza- 
tion of foreign trade; the establishment of a two-tier banking system; the preparation of fiscal 
reform; restructuring of enterprise ownership; privatization of agriculture, small business and 
retail trade; the preparation of large scale privatization; the promotion of foreign investment; 
etc. 
"This section draws on the paper Price Liberalization in Romania by Ioan Buda. 
5 
In spite of some achievements in restructuring, the macroeconomic stabilization of the econ- 
omy is close t o  failure. Real GDP declined by 13% in 1991 and 15% in 1992. Industrial pro- 
duction decreased by about 50% during 1989-92. The price level increased by more than 200% 
in 1992. During 1989-92 the official exchange rate of the lei against the US dollar decreased by 
a factor of 27. Foreign exchange reserves now cover the equivalent of several weeks of imports 
only. 
Price policy played an important role in the transformation process. It is useful to  stress 
here that liberalization of prices in Romania followed a very specific pattern which was not 
applied elsewhere. In contrast with other reforming countries, price liberalization in Romania 
had conclusively a gradual nature. Its individual phases had the following main features: 
January 1, 1990 
the introduction of a free pricing system for private producers; 
the contractual prices of agricultural products in state and cooperative sectors were in- 
creased and the possibility to sell excess quantities on the free market was granted; 
the responsibilities in forming prices in the existing institutional framework have been 
shifted downwards t o  the lower levels of decision-making. Free price formation, however, 
was limited in two cases: 
(a) when less than three economic agents supplied the same goods or service, and 
(b) when the prices were subsidized from the state budget. 
In these cases prices have been negotiated simultaneously by government and economic 
agents. 
November 1, 1990 
real price liberalization was started when the principle of free negotiations came into effect; 
former limitations were, however, extended on products and services of special importance 
for the national economy and population; 
the income compensation-indexation system was introduced; 
the list of subsidized products contained 21 items for production purposes and 11 items 
for final consumption; 
the exchange rate, used as the basis for negotiations, was 35 lei/US dollar.' 
April 1, 1991 
in order t o  prevent monopolistic price formation and to  decrease the rate of inflation, 
maximum indices for price increases were introduced; 
the number of subsidized products (for production purposes) decreased from 21 to  13 ; 
the exchange rate basis was changed to  60 lei/US dollar. 
July 1, 1991 
the former indicative price ceilings were abolished as they contradicted to  the principle of 
free negotiation; 
'The exchange rate of 21 lei/US dollar was introduced on February 1, 1990. The exchange rate of 16 lei/US 
dollar was previously valid. 
r monthly adjustments of prices for crude oil, electricity and raw materials, and quarterly 
adjustments of prices for natural gas were adopted; 
r the number of subsidized products increased from 13 to 15 in the first group and from 11 
to 14 in the second group. 
November 1, 1991 
r free negotiation of prices was supposed to take into account the following factors: 
(a) the exchange rate basis was changed to 180 lei/US dollar, 
(b) the adjustment of prices of domestic raw materials, fuels and energy to the world 
market level, and 
(c) the new salary indexation; 
r the level of mark-up was limited to 30 percentage points; 
August 1, 1992 
r the way of price- and tariff negotiation was modified under a condition of complete liber- 
alization of the exchange rate of the lei; 
r in price negotiations, an altered set of factors was recommended to be taken into account: 
(a) liberalization of the exchange rate of the lei, 
(b) the adjustment of domestic prices to the long run trends of prices on world markets, 
(c) the new level of social security contributions, and 
(d) the salary indexation scheme; 
r the number of items subjected to  the maximum indices decreased from 35 to  24; 
r the subsidies of several items (i.e., sugar, meat, dairy products, railway transportation) 
were removed and the total amount of subsidies was further decreased. 
At present, completely free negotiation of prices exists in the private sector and only 20% 
of prices in the state sector is subject to state supervision. The purpose of supervision is to  
prevent the state-owned suppliers from reaching a dominant position and gaining monopolistic 
profits. 
One striking fact of Romanian price development is that the rate of the exchange rate 
depreciation was much faster than the rate of price increase. While the price level increased 
during the period December 1989-February 1993 by a factor of 16, the exchange rate of the 
lei depreciated by a factor of 32. To get a better picture of the relation between the exchange 
rate policy and the price index, it would be necessary to analyze other factors influencing both 
variables like money supply or financial policy. There is an indication, that the changes in money 
supply contributed to  the inflationary pressures because of certain deficit financing. 
It can be argued, that Romania adopted quite a unique type of strategy different from those 
applied in former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Within three years, the authorities im- 
plemented rather drastic changes in economic parameters (repeatedly adjusted exchange rate) 
which were accompanied by many administrative measures like price control. The emerging 
picture is a policy mix combining drastic changes with a gradualistic approach, which was prob- 
ably powerful enough to  generate pro-inflationary expectations with negative future impacts. A 
dilemma arises: while this strategy could be feasible in political terms (public unrest after the 
first round of price liberalization led to  a postponement of the second round) it can prove to be 
very costly in economic terms. Experience stemming from this dilemma could be relevant for 
other countries in transition. 
One crucial weakness of Romanian reform seems to be the absence of competition policy. The 
law has not yet been issued by Parliament and the existing draft relies more on administrative 
price control rather than on anti-monopoly policy. In addition, there has been a delay of about 
a year or two in changing the depreciation schedules of the fixed capital. As a result, the budget 
was actually being balanced by de-capitalizing the firms. It is true, that if one allows companies 
to increase depreciation charges, they can pass them through the prices. But whether they really 
do this depends on the market and on the macroeconomic policy which is in place in a given 
period. 
Another important issue is a cost-plus approach of price formation. In spite of its application 
it has not yet led to market clearing: shortages of energy and many raw materials still remain. 
The idea was based on the exchange rate mechanism which does not seem to be appropriate 
under existing circumstances, when the currency is not convertible. As a kind of complement, an 
administrative allocation system governed by the Ministry of Industry has been used. However, 
prices held by price surveillance derived from the exchange rate did not really have a market basis 
either. The administrative dependence of prices on the exchange rate often led to a situation 
when the simultaneous occurrence of fixed prices and increasing costs resulted in enormous losses 
by firms. Consequently, built-in inflationary expectations were rather strong. This became 
especially apparent in 1992, when the attempt to  fix the exchange rate was made: inflationary 
expectations fostered the black market, where the unofficial exchange rate skyrocketed to  800 
lei per US dollar. 
The explanation of these developments is that Romania, in contrast with other countries, 
did not, in fact, use the exchange rate as a real instrument of stabilization policy. The effects of 
exchange rate changes on prices, and therefore on incentives which firms face, were not allowed 
to  come through the system. The main conclusion is, that it is very problematic to  impose 
financial discipline on firms when prices are only partially liberalized and mark-ups are under 
control. 
A positive issue is a kind of learning process which all firms have to  experience during 
the process of price liberalization. As they have never had any experience in price formation, 
it can happen, that many of them, 'unexpectedlyn obtaining full responsibility in this field, 
simply overshoot the 'rightn prices. Hungary provides evidence of how this learning process was 
started under the still quasi-reform socialist environment. The step-by-step relaxation of price 
regulation gave firms gradually more freedom. In the course of 1988-1990, as the socialist system 
collapsed, this process was transformed into real market-type price liberalization. Here lies the 
explanation, of why the price jump in Hungary did not have such magnitude as elsewhere. 
Albania provides an interesting example for comparison. With an even more distorted and 
isolated economic system, suffering from deep and widespread crisis: the Albanian government 
decided to  set in motion a very decisive reform program supported by a stand-by agreement 
with the IMF. Until 1992, Albania maintained an extremely rigid price structure which had not 
been altered for 45 years. "Ruthless" price liberalization was the first step in the macroeconomic 
adjustment program which began in August 1992. Under existing conditions such an approach 
seemed to  be the only available instrument allowing the radical break through of an incentives 
structure and the easing of enormous fiscal tension. All controls of retail and wholesale prices 
were eliminated except for a small group of essential commodities and services. Subsidies have 
been temporarily retained for six items (e.g., school books, medication, heating and urban 
transportation). In spite of this, retail prices of essential items rose by 250-400% and up to  
500% in case of wheat, bread, sugar, utility services, etc. All prices subject to  control were 
monitored monthly to  ensure that they remain roughly in line with costs. 
As indicated above, price liberalization in Albania was also heavily driven by the intention 
to  substantially decrease the cost of subsidies (connected with the old price system) and to  
'From 1989 until the beginning of 1992, GDP dropped by about SO%, open and disguised unemployment 
reached one third of the labor force in the state sector, yearly inflation exceeded 100% in 1991 with monthly rates 
oscillating between 10-15% at the beginning of 1992. 
decrease huge budget deficits caused by a dramatic drop of budget revenues: the share ratio of 
tax revenues to  GDP declined from 42% in 1990 to  28% in 1991 and even to  16% in the second 
half of 1992. Another motive behind price liberalization was to provide farmers with incentives 
to increase agricultural production in this recently privatized sector. 
4 The Role of Fiscal Policies During Transition 
In the course of transition, much of the burden of stabilization task rests on fiscal policy. But 
while contributing to  macroeconomic stabilization, the fiscal sphere itself has to  go through 
extensive restructuring and reconsideration of its manifold roles. As a result, it becomes a point 
of intersection of newly formed concerns and a source of different tensions which are typically 
manifested by budget deficits. At the beginning of the reform process, the task of keeping deficits 
under control does not seem to be a difficult one. But later on, GDP falls dramatically, total 
profits of enterprises decline and hand-in-hand with a decline of profit marginsg budget revenue 
drops. A simultaneous increase of social-related expenditures leads to  the emergence of a budget 
crisis with potentially destabilizing implications for the balance of payments, investment, size of 
public debt, etc. 
In tackling this issue, it is essential to  identify the causes of fiscal deficits, to  estimate the 
potential inflationary implications of budget deficits, and to devise reasonable and effective policy 
responses. The scale of the problem is different in the individual countries, but the danger of 
potential fiscal crisis is present almost everywhere. 
The problem of fiscal deficit became a central macroeconomic issue in Poland during the last 
two years.'' The collapse of profits already occurred in Poland in the second year of transition 
(in 1991). It is estimated, that the lower profitability of the enterprises decreased the share of 
budgetary revenues in GDP by 10 percentage points. As a result of separate development, the 
share of social expenditures (especially pensions) increased by 10 percentage points. Although 
the share of subsidies in total expenditures declined by 10 percentage points, the net impact 
is 10% as the amount of deficit (in relation to GDP) which could become reality in 1993. The 
scope of budget problems in the current stage (or at a later stage in general) seems to  depend 
on mistakes incited in an earlier stage. In Poland's case they are connected with a delay in fiscal 
reform, with protracted dependence on corporate income tax and with an under-estimation of 
the importance of indirect taxation. 
The ensuing increase of monetization of the deficit is being regarded in Poland as an obstacle 
to sustaining the downward trend of inflation and even worse as a source of igniting new inflation. 
Needless to  say, that deficits embody a dual threat: on the one hand, the jeopardy of inflationary 
pressures and, on the other hand, the danger of redistribution of income from investment (not 
only private but also government) to  consumption. The task for policy makers is to  realize all of 
the possible consequences of the current economic trend in the fiscal sphere and to  estimate such 
a budget deficit level which could be consistent with a targeted level of inflation. In a second 
step, it is necessary to  introduce fiscal measures enabling this level of deficit to  be reached. In 
Poland's case the fulfillment of certain fiscal criteria is of supreme importance with respect to 
maintaining the possibility of receiving any new loans from abroad and/or easing the burden of 
outstanding foreign debts. 
The package of measures developed to decrease the deficit in Poland has impacts both on 
the revenue side and on the expenditure side. On the revenue side, the most promising and 
 here are numerous explanations for the decline of profit margins: (1) the economic environment (both 
external and internal) to which the firms are exposed is much more competitive; (2) after the collapse of the 
CMEA, the cost structure of enterprises was rearranged in a way that the same level of fixed costs had been 
disbursed to the lower level of output; (3) unfavorable changes in terms of trade; (4) introduction of minimum 
wages; etc. 
''This section reflects the presentation of the paper Budget Deficit and Inflation in Transition Economies: The 
Case of Poland by Stanislaw Gomulka and the ensuing discussion. 
most politically feasible seemed to be an increase of turnover taxes. Another measure was the 
introduction of a temporary import surcharge in 1992. In spite of its certain controversial impacts 
(the level of effective protection increased from about 14% to about 20%) and the fact that its 
main purpose was a better shaping of the balance of payments, i t  also has fiscal implications. 
The third measure was the freezing of personal income tax brackets, which was politically very 
sensitive. And fourth, i t  was the freezing of depreciation allowances for investments made before 
1990. 
On the expenditure side, i t  was indispensable to reduce pensions relative to wages. The re- 
lation of pensions to wages increased from less than 50% to 65% during transition. In addition, 
the number of pensioners increased enormously. The government succeeded in persuading Par- 
liament to reduce the ratio of pensions to wages by 9 percentage points for 1993. The reduction 
of the wage bill and current non-wage expenditures are being proposed as well. These cuts are to 
be dispersed in a more or less equitable way in order to maintain a broadly-based social support. 
These combined measures aim at  lowering the budget deficit to about 5% of the GDP which 
is being considered as the level allowing the effective control of inflation. There is, however, 
no guarantee that a 5% budget deficit will really bring the inflation under control. Despite the 
fact that a 5% deficit is lower than deficits in many western countries, they are not mutually 
comparable for essential reasons. 
According to  some views, there is not much evidence on a strong 'crowding outn effect of 
budget deficits in Poland. There are even fears, that lower deficits would decrease the aggregate 
demand without pushing commercial banks to provide more credits because of the burden of 
bad debts inherited from the past. 
It is instrumental to inspect the fiscal policy in Poland on the background of general economic 
policy. In the first half of 1990, the economic policy was very stringent. It implemented the 
nominal targeting of money and credit expansion, very liberal trade regime, and even a budget 
surplus. Since, the economic policy parameters became much softer: import surcharge is being 
tolerated (and even encouraged by IMF), monetary and credit targets are now much looser, and 
a 5% budget deficit is acceptable. 
Like Poland, also Hungary faces the problem of increasing budget deficits which emerged 
during the last two years. The reasons, again, stem from the low level of revenues, on the one 
hand, and the overloaded social network, on the other. Nevertheless, with respect to  slightly 
different specific conditions an interesting comparison of the two countries arises. While in 
Poland the partial financing of the budget deficit by the Central Bank could lead to  an increase 
of the expected inflation rate, in Hungary it could lead to an outflow of foreign exchange. 
Due to  progress in developing the capital market in Hungary, budget deficits are not financed 
by the Hungarian Central Bank,ll but rather by emissions of marketable government securities. 
These may be bought by the Central bank and immediately sold the 'next dayn on the capital 
market. It seems, that in this respect Hungary has a wider maneuvering space (than Poland) 
in managing the monetary policy regardless of the current needs of the budget sphere. This 
advantage also stems from the increased propensity to save on the population side. The savings 
ratio of households increased from 2-3% (savings/disposable income) to almost 15% during the 
last three years, thus providing more liberty in financing much higher budget deficits without 
harming the foreign exchange position. Of course, it is questionable how long this situation 
could be relied upon. 
Apart from the budget deficit an issue of outstanding debt is present. Hungary accumulated 
a large debt in the past which it  is, according to  some Hungarian experts, desirable to  be 
reduced by the receipts from privatization. According to this view, not only current revenues 
and expenditures, but also public assets and liabilities should get into equilibrium in the medium- 
or long-run. 
In former Czechoslovakia, certain preparatory measures in the budget sphere were taken 
"This is also partly because of legal limitations. 
before the implementation of crucial reform steps.12 Already in 1990 the process of reducing 
the overall tax burden started especially by decreasing income tax rates. As is generally known, 
the tax burdens in former centrally planned economies were exceedingly high (at the end of 
1980s, the profit tax ranged between 75 and 85% in Czechoslovakia). Another step, logically 
consisted of reducing individual levies on profits. In July 1990, the so-called negative turnover 
tax was eliminated especially on foodstuffs (which resulted in the price increase of foodstuffs by 
about 25%). In order to  compensate the social impact of that measure, a kind of lump-sum flat 
payment was paid from the budget t o  every citizen.13 From a global fiscal point of view this 
operation was completely neutral, only the structure of certain budget items was changed. 
The restrictive stance of the new government coming into power after the revolution can be 
seen in the fact that, while the former budget for 1990 (prepared by the communist government) 
was compiled as a deficit one, the second version made at the beginning of 1990 was outlined 
as a surplus one. The idea behind this was to  break the uoverheatingn of the economy before 
implementing liberalization steps at the beginning of 1991. 
It is remarkable, that fiscal development in 1991 followed a pattern which was partially 
repeated in 1993. Immediately after price liberalization, profits increased significantly leading 
to  an increase of budget revenues and to  a huge budget surplus during the period January- 
April. At approximately the same time, output started t o  decline so that the tax base started to  
shrink and the budget slipped into trouble. The combination of these developments sharpened 
the problem of lack of liquidity in the corporate sector, because corporate taxes were paid from 
profits which were only accounting profits not being based on sales of production. This unhappy 
coincidence contributed to the huge amount of inter-enterprise arrears and later on also to  
tax arrears. These two phenomena seem to be very general and typical ones in economies in 
transition. 
In June 1991, when this development was still not so explicit, a decision was taken to  spend 
about 47 billion crowns (approximately 10% of the budget expenditures) for different purposes 
which contributed to  the disappearance of the surplus during the second half of the year and 
creating a deficit a t  the level of 2% of GDP by the end of the year. 
Similarly, a t  the beginning of 1993, a jump in prices, connected with a comprehensive tax 
reform, contributed to  a budget surplus; but further shrinking of the tax base, ensuing from 
an output declinegenerated partially by the split of the country-is worsening the budget 
perspectives in the medium-run. 
The year 1991 brought an important lesson: it is necessary t o  retain control over budget 
expenditures. There were two unsatisfactory budget results a t  the end of the year in addition 
to  what was indicated above. On the one hand, the behavior of spending agencies became quite 
autonomous and followed their own expenditure policy, which did not correspond to  the overall 
budget development especially in the second half of the year. On the other hand, there was 
asymmetry between the federal budget level and the two republican budgets which adopted 
different paths of expenditure policy and spent enormous amounts of money. This called for 
instruments enabling the flexible and efficient control of expenditures. 
In considering budgetary development, the impact of three long-term factors should be kept 
in mind. Firstly, ongoing output decline decreases the tax base and consequently, other things 
equal, budget revenues. Secondly, the same impact has a step-by-step decrease of marginal 
tax rates to  the levels consistent with reasonable market conditions. Thirdly, the deflators for 
public sector expenditures are considerably higher than the indexes for any other segment of the 
economy. This means, in other words, that more money in nominal terms (in comparison with 
average price indexes) need to  be funneled to  the public sector in order to  maintain the same 
level of expenditures in real terms. Taking into account the simultaneous occurrence of all these 
factors, a good shape of public finance (decreasing the share of expenditures was not faster than 
12This section is based on the paper and presentation The Budget Reform in Czechoslovakia and the Czech 
Republic by Pave1 S t ~ ~ i n e k  and on the ensuing discussion. 
 his payment to citizens could be considered a s  a kind of negative poll tax. 
decreasing the share of revenues) in former Czechoslovakia (and later in the Czech Republic) 
has been a good achievement. One explanation for this result was the realistic assessment of 
how much could be collected in taxes. 
The Czechoslovak experience in the fiscal sphere could be summarized as follows: 
1. It is extremely difficult to predict the tendencies in budget development in a transition 
period when most macroeconomic aggregates display wild fluctuations. The assessment of 
every process must be very careful in order to avoid wrong decisions. 
2. The easiest part of the budget reform is done at the very beginning of reform by cutting 
subsidies to the corporate sector. 
3. The above stated cuts do not save much money to the budget because the need of increased 
social transfers immediately arises to compensate for the loses in the corporate sector. 
The two last points suggest, that the bulk of social related expenditures (social services and 
public consumption) remains roughly unchanged both in terms of quantity and in terms of the 
approach to providing these payments at  the beginning of budget reforms. The general reform 
of this sphere is mostly still ahead and only fundamental restructuring of the whole public sector 
will change the entire economic environment. Among the changes, a crucial role will be assigned 
to the abolishment of the egalitarian approach, to the privatization of some activities, and to 
an increase in the efficiency of budget expenditures. 
One general issue arises in all economies in transition. It could be assumed, that cuts in 
subsidies had been partly transformed into inter-enterprise indebtedness still prevailing in the 
state sector which remains largely untouched. Commercial banks forced by different political 
pressures cannot stop giving credits to big but basically unhealthy firms because of the threat 
of mass bankruptcies. As these credits will be quite ubad" (because firms have not yet started 
any substantial restructuring), the portfolio of banks will worsen and their position will weaken. 
In solving this situation, the Central Bank will be asked to intervene and to render the last 
resort. The circle is thus being closed because the state body will again be responsible for 
the final outcome. The only difference in this metamorphosis is, that the direct tool of budget 
subsidies (in the hands of Ministry of Finance) is being substituted by less direct tool (in the 
hands of the Central Bank) consisting in granting credits to banks in danger. This reasoning 
provokes a question of whether the process of transformation could be started by macroeconomic 
stabilization leaving microeconomic restructuring for a later date, or more generally, whether 
the transformation process could be carried out in such a way that only some of its elements do 
remain under the control of the government? Thus, as an alternative to sharp cuts in subsidies 
there is an option to retain certain control over subsidies and not allow enterprises to behave 
in a chaotic manner and afford such financial undiscipline which is currently displayed in all 
post-socialist economies. 
5 Exchange Rate Policies: Do They Stabilize? 
Exchange rate policy occupies an important place in stabilization packages in many economies 
- 
in transition. Hungary introduced an adjustable peg system with the forint being pegged to 
a basket of two currencies (50% US dollar and 50% ECU) approximately reflecting the trade 
pattern of Hungary.14 The decisions on the change of the exchange rate is derived from the 
joint responsibility of the Central Bank and the government. While the government may decide 
about devaluation at any extent, the Central Bank has an authority to carry out any change 
within a pre-determined band of f 5% during one year. 
"This section draws on the paper and presentation Possibility for Using the Exchange Rate as Nominal Anchor 
for the Domestic Price Level: Some Evidence from the Hungarian Case by Artlir SzengyCrgyviri and the ensuing 
discussion. 
It is remarkable, that the even price and import liberalization (the latter started in 1989 and 
was finished in 1991) accompanied by the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate did 
not lead to  a collapse of the balance of payments.15 I t  suggests a certain undervaluation of the 
forint before price liberalization and thus a certain level of protection for domestic producers 
against foreign competition. 
In comparing the inflation rate and exchange rate one could conclude that deceleration of 
devaluations that happened a t  the beginning of 1990 probably contributed to the deceleration of 
inflation which followed about a year later despite a constant growth in money supply (expressed 
by broad money aggregate). In other words, the exchange rate served as an anchor for domestic 
inflation even if the nominal rate was modified several times. This conclusion (however persuasive 
when using simple macroeconomic modelling) is a bit surprising with respect to  the fact that 
Hungarian officials did not attribute this anchoring role a t  all to the exchange rate of the forint 
(at least not to the nominal rate). 
In thinking about anchor hypothesis as such one major issue arises: what could be expected 
from anchoring a currency in general? While anchoring inflation is probably feasible in the short 
run (the credible announcement by the Central Bank to maintain a certain nominal exchange 
rate has the power t o  break short run inflationary expectations), it becomes questionable in the 
medium- and long-run. In the medium- and long-run, the adjustment of the exchange rate to  
import and export competitiveness seems to be reasonable and advisable. This is implied by 
Polish experience indicating that using the exchange rate policy as a nominal anchor in 1990 
was a very difficult task. Two explanations could be pointed out here: 
1. Inflationary (or better non-inflationary) expectations reacted to  the declared exchange rate 
stability with a very long lag-reaching up to  12 months. Such a long lag understandably 
undermines the efficiency of this tool. 
2. Some phenomena seem to suggest that the anchor was put in the wrong place which led to 
an unexpected trade surplus a t  the beginning of 1990 on the one hand, but simultaneously 
generated strong cost-push pressures on the other. 
Another limitation of using the exchange rate as an anchor stems from the difficulty t o  
indicate, what the likely and equilibrium exchange rate is in the medium-run. The common 
feature of developments in Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia is that in the initial 
period of reforms, currencies in all three countries appreciated in real terms. The reasons could 
be described as follows: 
the aggregate demand declined and understandably the demand for imports declined; 
the real money stock declined; and 
the abolishment of subsidies to  imported raw materials substantially decreased the volume 
of their imports. 
When these factors are present, the exchange rate policy has a certain basis for decision 
making but after these factors fade, the next direction of exchange rate movements becomes a 
- 
big puzzle. 
In addition, an issue of wage policy exists. The attempts to use the exchange rate policy as 
a tool for reducing inflation can only be successful when real wages are kept down. If real wages 
- 
respond rapidly to even small changes in the nominal exchange rate, then the real exchange rate 
remains unchanged. 
To sum up, it seems that while Poland tried to  use the exchange rate as an anchor and this 
attempt was close to  failure, Hungary did not intend to do this but accidently succeeded in 
15The forint appreciated in real terms because the rate of growth of inflation differential was faster than the 
rate of appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
doing it.16 Nevertheless, one positive aspect remains in the Polish way of anchoring: it reversed 
the process of dollarization of the economy. 
In Russia, even the basic economic and policy issues have not yet been clarified." There is 
no clear concept of what type of economic reform should be implemented. On the basis of this 
general indecision one may ask the question of whether the Central Bank of Russia contributed 
t o  the stabilization of the exchange rate of the ruble or rather to  its destabilization recently. In 
order to  answer this question it is useful to  mention something about the institutional framework 
of the exchange rate policy. 
Before 1992, a multiple exchange rate system existed. Each foreign trade transaction corre- 
sponded to  its particular exchange r a t e w h i c h  were counted in thousands. At the beginning of 
1992, the system was retained but partially simplified by the gradual reduction of the number 
of different exchange rates. Nevertheless, the system as a whole still provided very negative sig- 
nals for exporters-these were stimulated to  keep foreign exchange revenues abroad and if they 
needed to  return them to  Russia they did not use the official exchange rates for the conversion 
into rubles. The introduction of the unified exchange rate system had been prepared during the 
first half of 1992. In the autumn of 1991, the Central Bank had a target of 80 rubles per 1 US 
dollar; in June 1992 the exchange rate was 112 rubles per dollar after an appreciation from 200 
rubles per dollar in January 1992. 
The officially declared intention to  maintain the nominal exchange rate within a certain 
range led to a complete run-down of foreign exchange reserves. In reaction to that, the policy of 
the Central Bank became more relaxed; even worse, June was the last month of a more or less 
responsible monetary policy or simply any policy. From that time, policy attitudes reversed- 
money supply started to  increase in line with prices and the exchange rate of the ruble started 
an irrepressible upward-sloping trend (depreciation). 
The unification of numerous exchange rates18 in July brought some positive incentives for ex- 
porters. They started selling their revenues through the official interbank market which allowed 
the Central Bank to  gradually decrease its participation in this market. It could be maintained, 
however, that the foreign exchange interbank market is still a relatively thin one despite its 
strengthening in recent months. With the pure inflow of foreign exchange being no higher than 
15-16 billion US dollars in 1992," the ratio of the volume of foreign currencies sold on the 
interbank market t o  total export receipts increased from the level of 2-4% during January-May 
1992 to  12-14% during June-December 1992 and even to  22-24% during January-March 1993. 
The latter figures are a bit higher than the prescribed 20% obligatory surrender (sale on this 
market). 
Despite these positive results, several reasons in favor of active engagement in the exchange 
market remain justified. One reason consists in mitigating the impacts of political factors on 
which the exchange rate is very sensit ivecapital  flight and speculative bubbles are a constant 
phenomena. According to  some estimates capital flight ranged between 3-5 billion USD in 1992. 
Secondly, the existing regulatory framework with ill-defined obligations of economic agents 
also brings a good deal of uncertainties. It is, for example, clearly stated that the obligatory 
surrender of 30% of export revenues are t o  be sold to  the Central Bank within a period of 14 
days. Another 20% of export revenues are to be sold on the exchange market (see above) but 
there is no time limit for this transaction. As a result, a hoarding of foreign exchange occurs and 
"It is straightforward that such a complex phenomenon like inflation could not be explained on the basis of 
exchange rate only. 
"This section is based on the paper and presentation Stabilizing the Market? 1992 Exchange Rate Policy of 
the Central Bank of  the Russian Federation by Andrei F. Kovalev and the ensuing discussion. 
"Two remarks are needed here. First, new exchange rates (with respect to the newly emerged currencies in the 
territory of the former Soviet Union) appeared. These should not be, however, confused with multiple exchange 
rates formerly applied to different kinds of transactions. Second, because a remarkable amount of imports (about 
40%) is still being subsidized and because the system of licensing and export quotas still exists in some sectors 
and even regions, an indirect quasi-multiple system of exchange rates still exists. 
"Probably more than 50% of all foreign trade transactions are made on a barter basis. 
quite massive sales are being realized at the moment (four times a year) when balances should 
be closed for tax purposes. 
Different simple criteria (like the so-called profitability criterion developed by M. Friedman 
or the criterion developed by Mayer and Taguchi) could be applied to assess the effort of the 
Central Bank aimed at stabilizing the ruble exchange rate. Realizing many limitations of such 
criteria in explaining the turbulent economic condition, it may be concluded that in contrast with 
the first half of 1992, the second half witnessed much more success in this field. With respect to 
scarce statistics and their low reliability, it is impossible (with available macroeconomic data) to 
judge whether the stabilization goal in itself was good or not. For example, there is no evidence, 
that exchange rate volatility had some adverse impact on investments. 
At the beginning of 1992 the price level in Russia was estimated as 1.5% of that in the USA. 
By the spring of 1993 it increased to  about 15% which represents a 10-fold increase within 15 
months. This was also reflected in wage evolution. During the first half of 1992 dollar wages 
increased sharply; while in December 1991 the average wage was 7 USD per month, in June it 
was already 41 dollars which represents a 6-fold increase. In sustaining that trend the average 
dollar wage could have reached 100 dollars per month by the end of the year. The turnover of 
monetary policy in June reversed that trend-the dollar wage diminished and moved within the 
range 25-35 USD in the spring of 1993. 
One way to improve the existing situation and break inflationary and devaluation expecta- 
tions is to  impose a 100% foreign currency surrender and to  implement a fixed exchange rate 
for a certain period of time. There are, however, strong fears that these measures could be 
introduced only on paper but not in reality. Due to the broad inefficiency of administrative 
measures it would be imperative to substantially increase the credibility of monetary policy and 
of economic policy in general. 
There was a prevailing consensus in former Czechoslovakia that the satisfactory functioning 
of the exchange regime is of crucial importance for the whole reform strategy.20 The issues like, 
for instance, what should be the type of exchange regime, the role of exchange rate, and the 
level of exchange rate, had been evaluated very extensively at  the very beginning of the reform 
in an ez ante way when devising the global transition strategy. 
After two years of transition, when entering the second stage2' of transition, the exchange 
rate regime and exchange rate policy again become the central policy issues in the Czech Re- 
public. But unlike the beginning, in this period some lessons not only from their own experience 
but also from the experience of other economies in transition could be learned. 
It is clear enough, that there is no ready theoretical concept of the exchange rate regime 
for a transition period. Despite the fact that the optimum currency area theory provides some 
insights into the relation between macroeconomic advantages of floating rates and microeconomic 
advantages of fixed rates, there are several dimensions for studying the problem with no one 
bringing ready solutions. In terms of size of the economy it seems that the smaller the economy 
(and more open) the more justified is the fixed exchange regime. But experience in the smaller 
countries is diversified. Similarly diversified is the experience of a certain country in different 
phases of the transition. 
At the beginning of the transition, the issue of exchange regime was closely linked to the 
issues of the scope of currency convertibility and to the creation of conditions allowing the chosen 
variant of convertibility to be sustained. Currently, the questions of how to go on with capital 
''This section reflects the paper and presentation The Exchange Rate and the Transition: The Case of the 
Czech Republic by Miroslav Hrnh'i and the ensuing discussion. 
"At least two stages of the transition period could be identified. In the first stage microeconomic stabilization, 
deregulation, and price- and foreign trade liberalization played a major role; in this period (which in former 
Czechoslovakia extended roughly from 1990 to 1992) the institutional changes could only be started. The second 
stage could be called as the adjustment and consolidation stage. Here the issues of microeconomic restructuring 
and developing those changes which were started in the first period arise (establishment of factor markets like 
the labor market and capital market, etc.). It could be assumed that concepts of the exchange rate regimes are 
different in these two stages of transition. 
account convertibility and external convertibility emerge. 
In Czechoslovakia, the choice of the fixed exchange rate was made, particularly for stabi- 
lization reasons. It is notable that the monetary authorities did not make any commitment to 
maintain the nominal exchange rate for any preannounced period. The surprising stability of 
the nominal exchange rate of the crown contrasts with experience made in neighboring countries 
like Hungary and Poland. Quite positive results of the exchange rate strategy chosen are the 
surplus in current accounts (trade deficit is more than outweighed by the surplus in services) in 
both years 1991 and 1992 and the fact that the outflow of short term capital just matches the 
inflow of direct foreign investment and loans. 
Despite many qualifications to the quality of data and analytical tools used, it is interesting 
to compare the exchange rate and purchasing power parity. It turns out that in Czechoslovakia 
the ratio was approximately the same at the end of 1992 as in 1990. Judging from the fact 
that this development is different from the development in Hungary and especially in Poland we 
may arrive at  the conclusion that the Czech crown is undervalued not only vis-a-vis convertible 
currencies but also vis-6-vis the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint. 
Another interesting insight is provided by calculating the real exchange rate. Although there 
was real appreciation during 1991-1992 the real exchange rate shows about the same position as 
at  the beginning of the transition. Even unit labor cost (in spite of a huge decrease of economic 
activity and a decline of labor productivity) is lower than before. 
At the beginning of the reform, Czechoslovakia had some specific comparative disadvantages 
which made the devaluation of the currency necessary. Among these the following could be 
mentioned: comparative disadvantage in marketing and in the design of products, discrimination 
in foreign markets, low price elasticity both for Czech goods abroad and for foreign goods at 
home, etc. Although from the analysis of fundamentals (purchasing power parity, parallel market 
rate, nominal effective exchange rate, real effective exchange rate, unit labor costs) a target for 
exchange rate policy cannot be derived, they indicate a relative undervaluation of the Czech 
crown and thus room for its gradual revaluation. 
The existing gap between the exchange rate and purchasing power parity generates another 
round of discussions of how to proceed with the exchange rate in the future. It is clear enough, 
that the existing policy of a relatively fixed exchange rate could not be based on an irrevocably 
fixed exchange rate. Such a step would not be justified at all because its macroeconomic costs 
could prove to be substantially higher than macroeconomic advantages. Also the introduction 
of capital account convertibility should be assessed with great care. It is advisable to only carry 
out this step when the danger of speculation is small. 
In forming the exchange rate policy a certain role could be assigned to an income policy. A 
positive development of current account balance via increased competitiveness could be influ- 
enced by a reasonable curtailment of wage growth. Austrian post-war income policy development 
could serve as a reasonable example. 
The improvement of current account records calls for a broadly based export promotion 
combined with anti-import measures. Export promotion measures comprise of tax reliefs for 
indirect taxes and for direct taxes for exporters; accelerated depreciation for exporters; pref- 
erential loans according to export performance; specific instruments for providing information 
for exporters; insurance of export credits; supplying all export services; etc. Anti-import mea- 
sures could, according to some views, consist of non-tariff barriers or import surcharges. In any 
case, export promotion measures should at least approach the standards currently applied in 
established market economies. These policies seem to be more preferable than changing the 
nominal exchange rate. However, any export promotion should be carefully handled because of 
the obligations connected with the Association Agreement with the European Communities and 
some other international agreements. The system should not use direct export subsidies and 
should not support any particular group or sector of the economy. It should stay transparent 
despite the strong tendency of certain pressure groups in all post-socialist states to introduce 
discretionary and protective regulations. Their danger consists of difficulties in their withdrawal 
once they are introduced. 
At the initial stages of the reform, Czechoslovakia became overnight a more open economy 
than some other economies in transition and even more open than many western economies. 
The average tariff incidence is below 6% and all of the other means of protection (like import 
surcharge) had been replaced during 1992. Moreover, the original protective advantage of a 
devalued currency is currently fading out. This opening was driven by a strong commitment to 
build up a fully-fledged market-oriented economy. In such an environment the exporters have 
many comparative disadvantages in comparison with their competitors in western countries. 
They have no access to export credits, no guarantees to export credits, no infrastructure, no 
established contacts, little information, bad communication networks at  their disposal, and so 
on. This is why the export promotion policies should focus on improving the environment of 
the exporters. 
A certain burden of maintaining the current account in a good shape could also be imposed 
on a so-called "fiscal devaluation" consisting of combining relatively high indirect taxes with 
relatively low income taxes. Taxes like VAT raise the prices of consumer goods but do not 
increase the prices for exported goods. 
6 Microeconomic Issues in the Macroeconomic Context 
A transitional economy is an economy moving from a system of macro-based over-centralized 
quasi-economic optimization to a system of micro-based optimization. When studying microe- 
conomic aspects of transition, a t  least two fields of analysis come to the forefront: 
1. the building up of a macroeconomic environment for developing the micro-based optimiza- 
tion, and 
2. the macroeconomic impacts of microeconomic behavior. 
The microeconomic environment in the Ukraine is being formed by many complicated factors, 
frequent contradictory policy objectives, and unfavorable external i n f l ~ e n c e s . ~ ~  For example, 
price liberalization (which started in early 1992) was initiated by the decision of the Russian not 
the Ukrainian government. Therefore, it could not have been incorporated properly into any 
broader reform strategy of domestic provenance. Such circumstances partially contributed to a 
dramatic worsening of the economic situation in the Ukraine. 
Apart from a sizable output decline, the price level increased about 25 times during 1992. One 
important reason was a substantial increase in the price of oil imported from Russia under ill- 
clarified conditions containing even some discriminatory features in comparison with all the other 
CIS countries. But, in explaining the inflation record, a crucial role should be attributed to very 
loose (or even undefined) fiscal and monetary policies. According to the data of the Ukrainian 
Ministry of the Economy, the budget deficit reached 17% of the GDP or even 32% (when also 
including some extra-budgetary funds) in 1992. But, alas, any formal procedures leading to 
cuts in budget deficits are completely missing. Certain wishes to cut budget deficits in 1993 
do not seem to be substantiated. Money supply (M2) increased 13-14 times during the period 
March-December 1992. Total credit to the economy increased 25-26 times during January 
1992-January 1993. The huge wage increase acted in the same inflationary direction. It is quite 
understandable that the ensuing high nominal interest rates darken all major parameters for 
any reliable microeconomic decision-making. With a 90% discount rate and a 160-200% interest 
rate on credits, the formation of any investment policy is being heavily deterred. Inflationary 
expectations are fostered by the permanent postponement of introducing the Ukrainian currency. 
In other words, current monetary and fiscal policies distort the macroeconomic environment 
which deters the formation of a new private sector. 
"This section is based on the paper and presentation Microeconomic Precondition for Macroeconomic 
(InjStability by Vladimir Schevchenko and the ensuing discussion. 
Policy-based inconsistencies or even explicit mistakes are only sharpened by the existing 
structure of the political scene dominated by agrarian and industrial lobbies. There are strong 
indications that these lobbies dictated to the government those policies thus causing both macro- 
economic and microeconomic mismanagement. It would be a mistake to  assume that these 
lobbies want t o  restore the former economic system and return to  the centrally planned economy 
with central control. In fact, they like the existing way of autonomy of having no financial 
constraints and responsibilities. 
Another explanation of the many-sided unfavorable development consists of a high depen- 
dency of Ukrainian industries on energy. Although the Ukrainian economy is about 50% larger 
than the Polish one, its high energy intensive industries consume more than twice as much en- 
ergy as Poland. This calls for massive restructuring programs and for an inescapable output 
decline in the most obsolete sectors. The immediate negative impacts of this restructuring could 
be temporarily mitigated by lower prices granted by Russia-gas and oil are still being sold by 
Russia for something like 60-70% of world prices. 
In absolute terms, this level of prices for oil and gas could be considered as an indirect 
subsidization of the non-Russian Republics from Russia. But if we take into account that many 
commodities were delivered from the Ukraine to Russia for 15-30% of the world prices, the case 
of subsidization becomes rather doubtful. 
The above described developments occurred at  a time when the Ukraine was still staying 
in the ruble zone with no financial, monetary, and clearing arrangements being settled among 
the republics. The absence of this framework created tremendous bilateral and multilateral 
inter-enterprise debts which also strongly influenced the microeconomic behavior of enterprises. 
The disintegration of the former Soviet Union generates a t  least three market options which 
lead to  three different types of microeconomic behavior: 
1. On the domestic market, the economic agents more or less drive the market towards a 
market equilibrium, adjusting themselves more or less t o  market conditions and trying to 
fulfill the customer's needs. 
2. On the market of the former CIS countries, the firms face tremendous problems caused 
especially by the volatile exchange rates of the ruble and by differing clearing settlements 
within different countries. Undervaluation of the Ukrainian currency is driven by a huge 
demand for rubles which are urgently needed to  pay for imports of Russian oil. Under- 
valued currency stimulates enterprises to  export any conceivable products which could be 
exported, thus negatively influencing the domestic market. Although certain attempts to  
regulate trade transactions between CIS countries had been made,23 inflationary expecta- 
tions are generated and firms are motivated to trade with countries in the hard currency 
area. 
3. As far as hard currency trade transactions is concerned, the Central Bank of the Ukraine 
introduced the floating exchange rate of the Ukrainian currency (karbovanetz) in March 
1993. The US dollar appreciated against the Ukrainian currency by 143% within one 
month. Surprisingly enough, the official exchange rate (which is based on the interbank 
currency exchange rate) is much higher than the exchange rate on the black market. The 
floating exchange rate system thus works in an unpredictable way which has negative 
implications for the behavior of exporters and producers. The same adverse impact has a 
very slow development of the multilateral clearing system which is supposed to  substitute 
for the existing bilateral trade. 
130ne solution consists in introducing the so-called 'matrix of ruble exchangesn containing rubles originating in 
non-Russian CIS countries and having different exchange rates than the ruble itself. It is becoming apparent that 
rubles originating in certain countries are not demanded at all. Moreover, ruble transactions are going through 
the Russian Central Bank which opens the possibility to regulate economic relations of the Ukraine with some 
other CIS countries. 
Faced with enormous economic difficulties, the Ukrainian government initiated certain changes 
in the strategy of the reform which mean a reversal to  some paternalistic approaches. This can 
be seen in two areas. On the one hand, the government did not make any progress in institutional 
changes. Small privatization is more or less freezed (only about 200 cases has been reported 
until now) and large privatization has not yet even started. On the other hand, the government 
enforced some old-type ministerial regulations like cutting off some leasing contracts, shrinking 
the possibilities of enterprises to  enter into joint-stock companies, etc. Moreover, some previ- 
ously adopted laws (like the anti-monopoly law and the bankruptcy law) are still not effective. 
According to  some preliminary indications, 200 enterprises out of 2,000 currently scrutinized, 
are going to  be declared as bankrupt, but purely on an administrative basis. Another example 
of a reversal in the reform effort is the fate of the governmental decree on the corporatization of 
enterprises adopted in January 1993. According to  this decree all state enterprises with assets 
up t o  1,5 billion Ukrainian karbovanetz had to  be converted into open joint-stock companies 
until the beginning of July 1993. The activation of this decree was completely stopped by the 
Ukrainian Parliament.24 
One could conclude, that the doubts arising around the general strategy of the reform which 
were mentioned in case of Russia are even more explicit in the case of the Ukraine. Even worse, 
the Ukraine is an example of very strong conservative attitudes in economic policy. Making a 
cross-country illustrative comparison one could observe that Russia is somewhere in the middle 
of the spectrum of the former CIS countries with Latvia and Estonia on the one end of the 
pole with relatively stable and predictable economic policies and the Ukraine on the other end 
of the pole with very unstable and unpredictable policies. This way of doing reform could be 
named as muddling through. "Self-inflictedn policy mistakes are only aggravated by the higher 
dependency of the Ukraine on deliveries of oil and gas and by generally less favorable external 
conditions and shocks coming from outside. Because of the above stated uncertainties as well 
as the numerous negative external factors, the fate of reform in the Ukraine remains pretty 
unclear. Taking into account the fragility of the political scene, the emergence of damaging 
political forces deteriorating the future of the country could be reasonably predicted. 
The nature of inflation in economies in transition after price liberalization and the nature of 
current output decline attract the constant attention of researchers. The problem is that there 
is not enough information on what is going on in these peculiar economies. A combination of 
macroeconomic, microeconomic, institutional, and behavioral explanations is needed. 
The decrease of GDP in former Czechoslovakia had its reasons on both the demand and the 
supply side.25 A decrease of demand was caused by both external reasons (like dissolution of 
the former CMEA, collapse of eastern markets in general, world recession and so on), and by 
internal (reform-induced) reasons like restrictive fiscal and probably also monetary policies. On 
the supply side of the economy some other factors also occurred: cost increases pushed especially 
by the devaluation of the crown; energy price increases; terms of trade deterioration; continuing 
trend of diminishing the total factor productivity (which already started at  the beginning of 
1970s); and monopolization of the economy. 
Monopolistic structure plays a special role in the conditions of post-socialist economies be- 
cause that kind of monopoly, inherited from the centrally planned past, is incomparable with 
what is known in western countries. In former socialist Czechoslovakia (according to  the Cdigit 
classification), there was only a single producer in more than 50 industries, in about 35% of 
the industries there were 2-3 producers, and only in the remaining 10% of the industries there 
were more than 10 producers. With a slight exaggeration, we may suggest that the only thing 
which happened during price liberalization and the step-by-step marketization of the economy 
was the transformation of this phenomenon from a less visible form to a more visible one. A 
"The official explanation of this step pointed out the option (opened to the managers) to buy 10% of the shares 
during three years which seems to contradict the "official ideologyw coined by some top political forces. 
25This section is based on the paper and presentation Product Slump in Czech-Slovakia: A Critical Overview 
by Pavel Mertlik and the ensuing discussion. 
blurred structure of property rights, typical for the centrally planned economy, was somewhat 
formally changed, but its nature seems to  be basically preserved in the state sector. The former 
soft budget constraint was hardened but, for many reasons, it still cannot be considered as a 
hard one. The sector of state owned enterprises is rolling on with great inertia possibly with its 
"big bang" still ahead. 
Despite the fact that the explanation of output decline as a result of strong monopolies is a 
tempting one, one should not forget to  develop persuasive arguments which really prove this. It 
would be instrumental, for example, to  look a t  profit margins and the profits of enterprises. The 
Polish case, namely, brings very little evidence that monopoly power would be a major factor 
in price formation. Profits accumulated at  the beginning of the transition could be attributed 
mainly to  inflation and price liberalization, being thus more or less a kind of paper profits. 
Another group of factors is related to  institutional changes. The rapid abolishment of the 
central planning system before the emergence of a market-led type of economic coordination 
opened a kind of institutional vacuum. The lack of efficient state control during a certain period 
of time enabled so-called spontaneous privatization-the informal transfer of state property into 
the hands of private entrepreneurs. These somewhat hidden processes between the state sector 
and the newly born private sector contributed to the distortion of the picture of the economy. 
While the decline of the state sector was relatively well recorded and its magnitude was some- 
times quite alarming, the real growth of the infant private sector was probably underestimated 
because of the lack of reliable statistical data. Spontaneous privatization was dynamized by 
strong incentives to grab the most "juicy" pieces of state-owned assets. 
The second type of institutional changes relates to large privatization. Its main features 
were defined in the middle of 1990, in the spring of 1993 large privatization was still in process. 
Needless to  say, that such a long process without any definite results imputed a great deal 
of uncertainty which goes beyond the ordinary level of uncertainty known in normal market 
economies. As a consequence, a great number of economic agents followed only short-term goals 
and displayed behavior accordingly. This was manifested, for example, by a very low level of 
investment in important segments of the economy and generally by a sharper decline of the 
GDP than would be substantiated by "objective" reasons. Because some activities related to 
privatization move along the border between legal and illegal ones, no comprehensive data is 
available. Some knowledge can be gained from anecdotic evidence or from sociological studies. 
Typically, the managers of state-owned enterprises struggle for obtaining control over enterprises 
they manage. The most recent information seem to indicate that numerous managers prefer the 
indirect forms of control (frequently with the use of voucher privatization) and disfavor direct 
forms of take-overs of firms. Ill-defined property rights, in the case of voucher privatization, give 
a large decision-making space for managers and bring a less troublesome way to reach the targets 
in comparison with the direct purchase of property from the government. A specific strategy of 
managers during spontaneous privatization consists of decreasing the market value of enterprises 
by reducing such indicators like output or profits, in the hope of a later and cheaper buy-out. 
The lesson from Hungarian experience is, that in the case of rapid privatization, managers of 
state-owned enterprises cannot be excluded from participating in spontaneous privatization. 
In addition to  output decline issues, the formation of the private sector has, indeed, fiscal 
consequences. It seems that the faster the transformation, the higher the tax losses because of the 
diminishing ability and/or willingness of private firms to  pay taxes. With the possibility of tax 
evasion and tax avoidance, tax receipts decrease faster than the output. The source of tensions 
in budget arises from the confrontation of diminishing revenues with "socially incompressible" 
expenditures linked strongly to  the inherited and distorted type of "socialist welfare state". 
The crucial difference between post-socialist economies and market economies is that while the 
private sector in market economies developed in an "organic" way before the emergence of the 
real welfare state, in post-socialist economies the formation of the private sector must "catch 
up" with the heritage. The low level of budget deficits in the Czech Republic could testify that 
the economy still remains in a "pre-transformation" phase. 
Another sign of the fact that the Czech economy is still a rather immature market economy 
could be identified by the hesitation of managers to lay off redundant workers in larger quantities. 
The same kind of hesitation pertained in Hungary but in a certain moment of transformation 
it abruptly changed and unemployment started to rise. Surprisingly enough, a good portion of 
the lay offs was accomplished even before privatization took place. 
There are assumptions that the voucher type of privatization contains the risk of reproduc- 
ing the monopoly setting of the economy. If reforms will not go beyond the pure and simple 
modification of existing monopolies, all of the other steps of the transformation process could 
have difficulties. Some fears could be connected with the penetration of foreign capital and thus 
with the reinforcement of a monopoly situation. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored, that for- 
eign capital (in contrast with domestic capital) can bring some positive assets like management 
schemes, new technology, work discipline, and a rational way of negotiating with trade unions, 
etc. 
In the former Czechoslovakia, the voucher type of privatization led to a dominant position 
of institutional owners (investment privatization funds established mostly by commercial banks) 
combined with a strong position of the state (realized mainly through the influence of commercial 
banks where the state has an important share). A relevant question could be asked, as to whether 
the banks, obtaining control over a growing amount of property, will prove to be the right owners. 
It is noteworthy that the emerging structure of ownership is different from the structure in many 
market economies, where the non-institutional owners (individuals, families) are more typical. 
In search for the causes of the output slump, one may also think about the shift of the 
economic regime from the supply constrained to the demand constrained. The former socialist 
type of economic coordination generated an excess demand, overheated the economy, imposed 
the administrative price formation, and forced the economic agents to a substitution both in 
consumption and in production. We may assume that the disappearance of these phenomena 
and the implementation of a fully-fledged market system will lead to a weakening of the primary 
and secondary sectors and to a strengthening of the tertiary sector. Before all types of changes 
are completed, complex reallocations can only temporarily worsen economic performance. 
7 Summary 
The prevailing ideas expressed by the participants during the workshop can be summarized as 
follows: 
The task of stabilizing the economies had been accepted in the participating countries in a 
different way and with various degrees of urgency. The most zealous countries in this field 
are Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and especially the Czech Republic. These countries display 
reasonable macroeconomic results. There are signs that the aggregate economic activity 
in terms of gross domestic output (or industrial output) is bottoming out (Hungary) 
or even recovering (Poland). The perspectives of economic growth in the territory of the 
former CSFR still remains unpredictable because of uncertainties connected with signifi- 
cant changes in property rights and delayed industrial restructuring. Inflation rates in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia are quite comfortable and are still manageable 
in Poland. Unemployment rates are high (except for the puzzling case of the Czech 
Republic) but not importantly higher than in some less developed countries in Western 
Europe. Foreign trade sectors were the sources of major disturbances in the region at 
the beginning of the transformation process but after initial adjustments they are more or 
less settled. A certain exception is Hungary in 1993 and to some extent Poland. Devalua- 
tions help to keep trade balances in affordable imbalances, but a more vigorous export-led 
growth is being hampered by the revitalization of western protectionism and world-wide 
recession. The ability of some countries to shift exports from eastern to western markets 
is noticeable. 
In Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, and the Ukraine the prospects for global 
economic recovery are much more problematic. Due to the many deep distortions inherited 
from the past, output decline in these countries is more dramatic and structurally unbal- 
anced. Numerous firms and large segments of the economies are endangered by the lack 
of both domestic and international competitiveness. These territories are also much more 
prone to  ethnic conflicts and long-term social unrests. These circumstances, multiplied 
by the existence of weak (or even corrupt) central authorities, will undermine the ability 
of central governments to  implement painful measures with sufficient speed and necessary 
efficiency. The willingness of the population to  bear the burden of transformation is also 
not unlimited. Output declines are more steep and the prospects for economic recovery 
are very uncertain. Inflation rates are out of control (with the exception of Bulgaria) 
because stabilization packages proved to  be either partial, contradictory and ineffective 
or not seriously meant. Some measures were shaped to support employment only and 
to  postpone economic collapse. This is the reason, why unemployment, for example, 
in Romania and Russia, is still not very high. Trade balances are acceptable but this 
is mostly because of domestic depressions and because the countries cannot borrow to 
finance their imports. Apart from some "objective" factors which are beyond any control, 
many failures in macroeconomic stabilization could be attributed to  disguised populist 
policies which underestimated or ignored (purposefully or not) the imperatives of long run 
macroeconomic stability. 
2. When considering the far-reaching transformation of post-socialist economies, it appears 
that the initial stabilization is not such a difficult task to  accomplish if a bal- 
anced, comprehensive, and consistent package (either explicit or implicit) of 
measures is launched and if there is enough consensus in the society to accept 
the inescapable discomfort connected with its implementation. Indeed, the initial 
enthusiasm of broad layers of the society after anti-communist revolutions; accumulated 
(though very limited) personal wealth from the past; and the already declining paternal- 
istic activities of the socialist state to its citizens helped to  maintain the consensus for a 
while. But after the expiration of these "assets" the impacts of many economic adjustments 
impute weaknesses, tensions and potential fragility into the economy which generates a 
need for new "rounds" of stabilization effort. Typically, such a chain runs via the 
fiscal sphere where widening deficits call for additional anti-inflationary measures which 
lower the aggregate demand and thus sharpen global decline. Another pattern appears in 
the foreign trade sector where devaluations, apart from a transient impact on export, also 
provide inflationary stimuli which, after their price and wage adjustments, may open the 
space for another devaluation. 
3. It is customary to  distinguish between the shock and the gradualistic approach to  stabiliza- 
tion of the economies. Even if we accept this somewhat misleading terminology (because 
in reality it is much more complex than these simple labels) it seems that whichever 
path post-socialist countries choose at the beginning they arrive, after some 
time, to surprisingly similar issues in the further transformation of the economies. 
These are, for example, lagging restructuring of large segments of industries, immature la- 
bor and capital markets, lack of the supply response, under-capitalization of enterprises 
and banks, the abuse of advantageous positions during privatization, unrecorded shadow 
activities (which cause great fiscal losses) or even economic criminality, widespread inter- 
enterprise indebtedness, short-run oriented goals of economic agents, and so on. Many 
of these issues cannot be solved by any macroeconomic policy; rather institutional re- 
forms, completion of the legislative framework, public sector transformation and 
many-fold micro-based policies (e.g., export promotion, private sector promotion, com- 
petitive policy, etc.) are highly needed. It is obvious that these complex measures will take 
a good deal of time to be developed and become effective. Thus, the fast, smooth and bal- 
anced shift of attention of policy-makers from macroeconomic policies to  microeconomic 
policies seem to be on several basic preconditions for the success of transition. 
4. Features of macroeconomic policies in a region has evolved. In some countries (like Poland, 
Slovakia, or Russia) the init ial  s t r ingency manifested by restrictive monetary, fiscal 
and wage policies was pa r t l y  (or  fully) relaxed a n d  coordinated w i th  respect  t o  
o t h e r  economic policy- or political goals. The period from 1990-1992 could be 
labeled, with some exaggeration, as a transition from an "academic enlightenment" to  a 
"pragmatic awakening". While shifting from uclean-table-ideas" to an "everyday-dirty- 
bargaining-with-power-groups" the governments frequently loose the conceptual way of 
policy making from sight and their time horizons for decision-making do not extend beyond 
the next election day. The movement in the direction of the least resistance and political 
compromises are becoming typical. Political interests and partisan maneuvering seem to 
dominate over pure economic rationales. 
5. The efficiency of stabilization policies is uncomfortably l imited b y  numerous  
factors inheri ted f rom t h e  past  whose replacement will take a long time. To enu- 
merate just some of them: undeveloped financial markets (under-developed and under- 
capitalized banking system, absence of many financial instruments); no real labor market; 
rudimentary capital market and lack of capital in general; strong position of state owned 
monopolies; under-developed infrastructure; huge over-dimensioned energy and material 
intensive industries; lack of managerial skills, marketing and financial knowledge; missing 
or only evolving legislative framework; heavily polluted environment; strong egalitarian 
attitudes; etc. But there is a mutual or even circular interdependency: the further devel- 
opment of all these areas is conditioned by macroeconomic stability but without having 
important policy tools at its disposal (like, for example, consolidated banking system or 
efficient tax system), and/or without having the functioning markets the maintenance of 
reasonable macroeconomic stability is rather difficult. 
6. It is extremely important and advisable for any country in transition to launch credible 
and as far as possible t ransparen t  economic policy. Equally important is t o  main ta in  
the m o m e n t u m  of t h e  reforms and not allow interest groups to  consolidate their posi- 
tions and anti-reform attitudes. As this is also the case in established market economies, it 
is even more relevant advice for countries in transition, which provide many "irresistible" 
opportunities for (for example) reaping wind-fall profits or benefiting from exclusive and 
prominent posts which are very difficult t o  eliminate later. Ukrainian agrarian and indus- 
trial lobbies serve as a negative example. 
7. When transforming the economies one gloomy circumstance emerges. At a certain moment 
in time the "old world" already does not exist and the contours of a "new one" are not yet 
visible. The ensuing economic and social frustration is ideal ground for the renaissance of 
"third wayn ideas. However attractive these ideas seem to  be, they embody the danger 
of a back-water. If the economy is stuck in no-mans-land between "centrally planned 
system" and market society it "gains" the flaws of both without having the benefit of any. 
8. Comparison of the results of ways the price liberalization was carried out in countries 
under consideration supports the fast and rather comprehensive approach in contrast with 
phased and drawn out approach that was implemented in Romania. Though the former 
approach, indeed, imposes a shock leading to  a steep decline of consumer demand, the 
latter approach (especially when accompanied by repeated devaluations and extensive 
price controls) generates strong and long-run inflationary expectations with all possible 
negative consequences for crucial economic variables like investments, savings, etc. 
9. Fiscal policy becomes a focus of many unfavorable developments during transition: on 
the one hand a major threat of rising deficits emerges (coincidence of declining receipts 
connected with poor macroeconomic performance with pressures for an increase of social 
expenditures), on the other hand a deep restructuring of both revenue- (new tax sys- 
tems) and expenditure side (reshaping of public sector) is needed to comply with a market 
economy. Fiscal sphere can become a source of many economic disturbances (excessive 
taxation, crowding out effects, unsatisfactory social net) whose effects should be timely 
foreseen, carefully evaluated and as much as possible ez ante minimized. However, the fu- 
ture budget development is extremely difficult to predict in a period when macroeconomic 
aggregates display wild fluctuation. 
10. Exchange rate regimes and policies were important parts of stabilization packages. While 
exchange rate policy in Russia was close to failure, Hungarian adjustable peg and Czechoslo- 
vak fixed exchange rate (in contrast to  Poland) work pretty well. There are indicators 
that nominal exchange rate really did assist in anchoring the inflation in both countries. 
However, for a more general assessment of inflation records some other variables (like 
money creation, wage policy, etc.) should be taken into account. Because current account 
convertibility works smoothly in the Czech Republic the introduction of capital account 
convertibility is being slowly considered. 
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